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Abstract
According to a new hypothesis based on implicit egotism, people gravitate toward cities,
states, and careers with names similar to their own names. To support this hypothesis,
Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones (JPSP, 2002, 82(4) 469-487) report a series of results
regarding distributions of names in different cities, states, and jobs. In the present article new
analyses of the original data are reported, showing that the hypothesis is not supported for
the large majority of names considered by the authors, and for some names even the opposite
result is found. In addition, a meta-analysis reveals that either the data are unreliable, or the
hypothesis can not be supported in the whole population of names. Overall, the original data
give no support of the idea that implicit egotism influences major life decisions.
      3
The fascinating history of scientific enterprise is studded with hypotheses that have
challenged our understanding of reality, the way we look at our world, and our
comprehension of the causes underlying every-day life events. Among those challenging
hypotheses, we can surely number a new social psychological hypothesis, recently proposed
by Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones (2002), which states that people prefer to live in places and
to pursue careers with names similar to their own names. Behind this hypothesis is the notion
that people like to feel good about themselves (Allport, 1961; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995),
thus they like objects associated with the self (Beggan, 1992), including the letters of their
names (Nuttin, 1985; 1987) or the numbers of their birthdays (Miller, Downs, & Prentice,
1998). Consequently, they prefer things (like cities, states, or jobs) that have associations
with those objects. The consequence of this notion, the hypothesis goes, is that people named
Louis prefer to live in Saint Louis and people called Florence choose to live in Florida. 
To test this intriguing hypothesis, Pelham et al. conducted a large number of studies,
reported a series of significant results, and concluded that the data support their hypothesis.
The aim of my contribution is to challenge this conclusion. I propose that the original
analyses can be questioned on the following ground: In all the studies reported by Pelham et
al., the sampled units are not the individuals, as the authors' analyses implicitly assume, but
rather the names, towns, and jobs the authors consider. The data structure in each of the
original studies is a nested data structure, with individuals nested under names and towns (or
jobs). Pelham et al.'s analyses seem to ignore this nesting structure and treat the individuals
as units, casting doubt on the adequacy of the statistics that are used, the test of the
hypothesis, and the generality of the effects. 
In this contribution I have re-analyzed all of the data reported by Pelham et al. in the
original article, and found little evidence in support of their hypothesis. Using statistical
analyses that take into the account the structure of the data, I show that the hypothesis is not
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supported in the great majority of the tests, and in some cases its opposite is statistically
verified. Specifically, the data allow reliable tests of the hypothesis for 74 names or numbers.
Fifty-five of these 74 cases give no significant result whatsoever, four yield a significant
result contrary to the hypothesis, and only 15 yield a significant result in support of the
hypothesis1. For the remaining data which do not guarantee a reliable test of the hypothesis, I
show that the method used by the authors can yield significant results due to spurious effects
and sampling biases. Finally, treating all the names used by the authors as randomly
sampled, I use Bernoulli's law of large numbers to show that, within the boundaries of my
approach, either the hypothesis is not supported in the population, or that the data are likely
to be biased. Overall, my analyses suggest that the data reported by the authors do not
support their hypothesis. 
The Original Data and Method
The original research deals with the hypothesis that people gravitate toward cities,
states, or careers that have names similar to their personal names or birth dates. For the sake
of brevity, in this contribution I will talk about names whenever I refer to objects related to
self (names or birthdays), and to places whenever I refer to the target of decisions (cities,
states, careers). Therefore names are sometimes birthdays, and places are sometimes cities,
sometimes states, and sometimes careers, depending on the specific study under discussion. I
will use the expression name-place match to refer to the combination of name of a person
and name of a place that share the same initial letters (Louis-Saint Louis), whereas I will use
the term name-place mismatch to refer to pairs of personal name and name of a place that do
not share the same initial letters (Louis- Toronto). 
The original empirical evidence is based on 10 studies using data collected from
archival records publicly available on the internet. In each study, the authors chose a number
      5
of personal names and a number of places, and counted how many people with each name
lived in places with names similar to the personal name. As a general method, the authors
looked at the probability of occurrence of name-place matches, they estimate the expected
probabilities due to chance, they compare the two probabilities, and draw conclusions
concerning the hypothesis. Because the 10 studies reported by Pelham et al. differ in the
number of names considered, in the way the expected probabilities are computed, and the
way statistics should be applied, I will treat the studies in different sections, grouping the
studies depending on their shared characteristics2.
Overall, there are three groups of studies that share the same characteristics: a) Study
5, the "Saint cities study", where only name-place matches are considered and the expected
probabilities of names are drawn from the entire population of American names; b) Studies
2, 3, 4, and 6, where a set of names (more than two) and a set of places (more than two) are
cross-tabulated, providing data about both name-place matches and mismatches; c) Studies 1,
7, 9, and 10 where two name-place matches are compared in 2x2 tables. 
As I presently show, those three categories of studies are not equivalent, for they have
different degrees of reliability, different sampling biases, and require different
considerations. The first category includes the best and most accurate data, the  second
category includes data which are less reliable but still workable, the third category represents
poor sampling and share features of anecdotal data. I therefore start my analysis with the best
data set available (the first category or Study 5 in the original article).
The Saint City Study
The rationale of Study 5 is the following. If people gravitate toward cities that remind
them of their own name, we should observe that cities featuring a personal name (as Saint
Louis, Saint Joseph, Saint Marie, etc.) should attract people named with that name (Louis,
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Joseph, Marie), more than what we would expect by chance. Upon this idea, the authors
considered all the 35 American cities named after a Saint (eight with a female name, 27 with
a male name), collected the actual frequencies of people with the Saint name living in the
city, and compared those frequencies with the frequencies of each name in the whole
American population (see Table 1 here and table 8 in the original contribution3). 
To test the hypothesis, the authors used an overall test, which is based on the
comparison between the sum of the actual probabilities of name-place matches (column 3 in
Table 1) and the sum of the expected probabilities given by chance (column 2 in Table 1)4.
Because this overall test ignores the fact that the units of analysis are names and states rather
than individuals, this overall test does not test the hypothesis. The overall test tells us only if
the two distributions (actual and expected probabilities) are different (Cramer, 1999).
Obviously, this is necessary but not sufficient to test the hypothesis. This overall test, in fact,
might be significant even if only one name-place match out of 27 is significantly different
from chance, while the rest of the name-place matches are as likely as chance or even less
likely than chance. 
The correct test of the hypothesis should generalize the effect across names. We
therefore need to test how many names reveal a significant effect in support of the
hypothesis, how many are not in support of the hypothesis and how many, if any, are against
the hypothesis (i.e., significantly less than chance). Only by considering this consistency of
the effect across different names we can evaluate if the hypothesis is supported by the data.
Table 1 reports the tests and the significant effects I found for the "Saint" data set. As regards
female names, I observe that the expected and actual name frequencies are different
(
  2(7)=69.0 p < .01), but only two names (Mary and Clair) are statistically significant from
chance. This case exemplifies the aforementioned inadequacy of the overall test. For female
names, in fact, the overall test (
  2=69.0) is significant in that one name-place match (Mary
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  2=59.89) accounts for almost all the differences between the expected and the actual
frequency distribution. 
As regards male names, the expected and observed frequency distributions are also
different (
  2(26)=606.9 p < .01), and 10 individual name-place matches are significantly
different from chance. Of these 10 significant results, however, six are in support of the
hypothesis and four are against the hypothesis, that is people with a name matching the city
name are significantly less likely to live in that city. For male names, the inadequacy of the
overall test is even more pronounced than for female names: In Saint Louis the observed
frequency of the name Louis is 2266 and the expected frequency is 1495, clearly in support
of the original hypothesis. But if this one city is left out and the data for all the individuals
for the 26 cities are used, the observed frequency of name matches is 1729 and the expected
frequency is 1981, clearly in the opposite direction from the hypothesis. So, the result
reported in the original article, ignoring cities and names as the unit, derives simply from a
single city-name matching5.
All things considering, the best data set available from the original research yields
results that can hardly be considered supportive of the name-place matching hypothesis. Out
of 35 names, for 23 there is no evidence in support of the hypothesis, for eight the hypothesis
is supported, and for four the opposite of the hypothesis is found6. Disregarding test of
significance, the analyses for all 35 names reveal a difference between the observed and the
expected frequency in the predicted direction for 16 names, whereas for 19 names, this
difference is in the wrong direction. 
Such small probability of significant effects should also be evaluated in light of the
sampling effects that might exist. I will discuss the meaning of those results in light of
potential sampling errors in a more detailed and statistical fashion later on. I now turn to the
second type of studies Pelham et al. described in their article, and show that the situation is
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not much different from the one above.
The Cross-tabulation Studies
Studies 2,3,4, and 6 are conducted as follows: N names and N states (or cities) are
selected, such that each name (e.g., Florence, Georgia, Louise, and Virginia) can be matched
with a state (e.g., Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia) according to its initial letters. The
frequency of people living in each state with each of the names are collected from public
archives, and an NxN table is constructed. To test their hypothesis, the authors computed an
overall test (with 1 degree of freedom), based on the difference between observed and the
expected probabilities of the name-place matches. All of the studies, according to the
authors, yield significant results in support of the hypothesis. 
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As for the Saint city study, an overall test is not informative in that one name can be
responsible for the overall effect, as for Saint Louis. In contrast to the Saint city study,
however, we can not simply test each name-place match in order to count the number of
significant results, because we do not have the expected distributions in the whole
population. Thus, the expected frequencies (due to chance) can only be computed using the
marginal frequencies of the tables. Because the tables include very few names and cities
(from four to eight), those data pose several different problems: First, the population-wise
distribution of a name is computed out of four, seven, or eight cities, rather than across the
thousands of cities that form the real population. Thus, substituting only one city in a table
may be enough to change all the results. Second, the expected frequency of a given name in
the letter-matching place is not computed based on the population of other names in that
place, but rather on the  few particular names selected in the study. Thus, changing only one
name in the table can yield completely different results. Third, the effects one might find can
be due to the proportion of people in the mismatching cities rather than in the matching city
(see below for examples).
To avoid arbitrary effects, we should test the hypothesis on the NxN tables using a
logic that considers names as units of analysis, across which generalization is sought.
Consider a case with four names and four cities. The hypothesis states that if my name is A,
it should be more likely that I live in Apolis than in Bpolis, Cpolis and Dpolis7. Thus, the
first necessary condition is that the distribution of probabilities of people named A in the four
cities should be different from the expected (from chance) distribution. The second condition
is that the probability of A in Apolis should be higher than chance. The third condition is that
the probability of A in all the other cities excluding Apolis should be random (equal to the
expected). The necessity of those three conditions can be easily appreciated in Figure 1.
Figure 1a shows the  probabilities provided in Pelham's et al. Study 3, of living in eight
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Canadian cities if your name is Tor* (read names beginning with Tor). The values in the
figures are the differences between the expected probability and the actual probability of
each cell, such that 0 indicates chance probability, positive values mean more likely than
chance, and negative values mean less likely than chance. I chose this example in that for the
name Tor* , the hypothesis is clearly verified, so we can appreciate how the method I
propose applies to a positive case. 
As can been seen in Figure 1a, the probability of the match Tor-Toronto is higher than
chance, and the rest of the probabilities are uniformly low. This means that, as the hypothesis
predicts, people named Tor* are more likely to be found in Toronto than they are in the other
seven cities. This means also that if we test the distribution of Tor* in the eight cities against
the expected distribution, we find a significant effect, whereas if we remove Toronto, we find
no significant effect. The first test tells us that people named Tor* do not distribute randomly
in the eight cities, the second test tells us that this is due to the fact that people named Tor*
are over-represented in Toronto. 
Why do we need the second test? The reason is that the expected frequencies are
dependent on the frequencies of the few names in the table, thus without the second test we
can not attribute a significant effect to the name-place match. To appreciate this, consider the
probabilities of living in the eight Canadian cities if you are called Edm*, depicted in Figure
1b. Here also we see that the match Edm-Edmonton is more likely than chance, but in this
case the effect is due to the fact that people named Edm* are under-represented in Toronto
and Hamilton, with a consequent increase in the remaining cities. As a consequence, it seems
that people called Edm* gravitate toward Edmonton, whereas they actually gravitate, with
higher probability, toward Calgary and Vancouver, and, with around the same probability,
toward London and Winnipeg. Thus, for the name Edm*, the effect is not due to the letter
matching, but instead to the distribution of people in Toronto, Hamilton, and Calgary, clearly
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outside the reach of the hypothesis. 
The previous reasoning leads to the following test: a) Compute the Chi-square test for
the distribution of people named X in the N cities (against the expected values); b) compute
the Chi-square test for the distribution of people named X in the N-1 cities, excluding the
matching city (against the expected values re-computed after deleting the matching city).
Because the requirement of randomness in the second distribution may seem too
conservative, we should at least test that the distribution of people, excluding the matching
city, should be more similar to the expected distribution than the distribution including the
matching city. This can be accomplished by computing the ratio of the two Chi-squares (with
and without the matching city). The ratio of two Chi-squares, each divided by its degrees of
freedom, distributes as a F (cf. Isaac, 1999), and its significance can be evaluated as in the
ANOVA model, using the F distribution8. If the ratio is significant, the hypothesis is
supported for that particular name. Then we can count how many names support the
hypothesis.
Using this method I have re-analyzed all the tables cited by the authors in Studies
2,3,4, and 6 (see Tables 2 and 3 in this contribution). Study 2 considered one table of eight
names (table 2 in the original article). I obtained one significant result. Study 3 considered
one table of eight names (table 3 in the original article). I obtained one significant result.
Study 4 considered four tables of four names each (tables 4,5,6, and 7 in the original article).
I obtained two significant results for table 4, one significant result for table 5, two significant
results for table 6, and one significant result for table 7. Study 6 considered one table of
seven birthdays, cross-tabulated with seven cities featuring names which include numbers
(Two Harbours, Three Oaks, etc.). Here I found no significant result (see Table 4). In this
last study, the distribution of people with each birthday across the seven cities is equal to the
expected distribution, so no further test is necessary to reject the hypothesis.
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To test the validity of my method, it is worth noting that it yields a significant result
for Tor-Toronto, whereas it yields a non significant result for Edm-Edmonton, as we would
expect by looking at the graphs in Figure 1. To reinforce its validity, note also that my
method yields a significant result for Texa-Texas, and a non significant result for Illi-Illinois,
an outcome that we would expect after inspecting the probabilities depicted in Figure 2.
Overall, those studies allow us to test the hypothesis 39 times. I obtained eight
significant results in support of the hypothesis. This means that across those studies, 79% of
the names yield no effect whatsoever. It seems doubtful that these represent support for the
hypothesis when the hypothesis is refuted 79% of the cases9. Furthermore, this 21 % of
positive cases should be evaluated in view of nonrandom sampling of names used by the
authors, and the very small number of names employed to compute the probabilities (see the
meta-analytic section below).  
2x2 Table Studies
Four studies of the original research are based on 2x2 tables. In Study 1 two names
and two matching cities are selected, the frequencies of people with those names in those
cities are cross-tabulated, and the frequencies are evaluated with a Chi-square. In Studies 7,9,
and 10, the same operation is conducted for jobs instead of cities. 
For these studies, of course, no new analysis can show different results. Are those data
therefore reliable tests of the hypothesis? I propose that they are not, for a simple reason:
Because the unit of the analysis should be names and not people, each 2x2 table should be
treated as hardly more than a single observation. As with any test performed on an extremely
small sample size, serious problems soon arise: First, the fact that we find a significant result
in a 2x2 table does not imply that the effect will generalize if we enlarge the number of
names in the sample. Second, 2x2 tables can yield a significant effect for an infinite number
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of reasons beyond the correspondence between names and places. I now provide evidence
relevant to these two major problems.
Assume that 2x2 tables were reliable ways to test the hypothesis. If so, I can test the
hypothesis in the 2x2 tables contained, for instance, in the 8x8 table of Study 2 or Study 3. In
each NxN table, in fact, there are (N-1)N/2 distinct 2x2 tables which cross-tabulate two
name-city matches. I can therefore use these data, which according to the authors provide
evidence in support of the hypothesis, to construct 28 2x2 tables that could be examined
individually. For each data set (original tables 2 and 3), the 28 tables can be formed
matching, in turn, every two names with the corresponding two cities (that is, the first table
cross-tabulates Tor and Vanc, with Toronto and Vancouver; the second Tor and Ott with
Toronto and Ottawa, and so on up to the last table which cross-tabulates Ham and Lo with
Hamilton and London). For each table we can compute the Chi-square according to Pelham
et al. method. 
The results I found clearly show the inconsistency of results yielded by 2x2 tables. As
regards the data of Study 2, out of 28 tests, I found 17 significant results, 14 in favor of the
hypothesis and three against the hypothesis. As regards to the data of Study 3, out of 28 tests,
I obtained 11 significant results in support of the hypothesis, and one against the hypothesis.
Thus, less than half of the tests show a significant effect and half a non-significant effect.
Consequently, the fact that one 2x2 table yields a significant effect for a name, does not
imply that the name would show a consistent effect when compared with other names. This
means also that when a name does not show a consistent effect when compared with many
names, it can still produce spurious effects when compared with only one name. We can find
evidence of this bias by analyzing the birthday study (Pelham et al.'s table 7). If we use a 2x2
approach on table 7, we obtain four significant results in favor of the hypothesis, despite that
fact that table 7 is not different from a random table, as indicated by my analysis of NxN
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tables and by a standard Chi-square test (
  2(36)=42.95, p=.19). 
Do these analyses using 2x2 tables only fall short in generalizing the hypothesized
effect? Unfortunately not. The major problem we face by using 2x2 tables is that the sample
of names one uses is so small as compared with the population of names, that the effects can
be due to a variety of spurious factors affecting the data. To show the danger associated with
2x2 tables, I have taken the original table 2, and explicitly remove the possibility that any
effect is due to the name-letter matching. This can be done by exchanging column 1 with
column 8, column 2 with 1, column 3 with 2, and so on, with the resulting effect that the
hypothesis becomes supported when Georgi-California, Cali-Texas, Texa-Florida, Flori-
Illinois, Illi-Pennsylvania, Penny-Ohio, Ohi-Michigan, Michi-Georgia are more likely than
other pairs. I then constructed the 28 2x2 tables again, and ran my tests. Out of 28 tests, I
obtained 15 significant results, 12 in favor of the hypothesis and three against the hypothesis.
Consequently, even when I removed the possibility that the statistical effects are due to the
matching of names and places letters, I was able to produce about the same proportion of
significant results than by matching names and cities according to the letters in their names.
And this is not all. 
We can take this reasoning a step further. In a 8x8 table there are 40,320 possible
orders of the columns, in 14,833 of which no name is matched with the corresponding
original place (cf. Roberts, 1984). Those 14,833 orders produce 415,324 2x2 tables (14,833 x
28) in which names and places are mismatched. Importantly, because in these 415,324  tables
the correspondence between names and places is removed, almost no effect in the original
direction should be found (more exactly, no more than 5%), both under the hypothesis that a
name-letter effect does exist, and under the null hypothesis of no effect at all. That is, as
along as no spurious effect occurs, almost no effect should be found in these tables.  Instead,
using the data in table 2, I found 94,887 2x2 tables (22%) yielding a significant result in
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direction of the hypothesis (63,734 or 15% for table 3). Thus, even when non effect should
be found irrespective of the null hypothesis we intend to test, we still observe a substantial
number of statistical effects that are neither random nor justifiable with the authors'
hypothesis. Consequently, they are spurious effects due to the fact that a 2x2 tables samples a
very tiny part of the  existing population of names and places. On the basis of these
considerations, we can reasonably ask whether single 2x2 tables presented in Pelham et al.
Studies 1,7,9, and 10 yield a real effect or are drawn from the same population of our 94,887
tables producing spurious effects. The answer is that we simply do not know. This is another
reason why 2x2 tables are not suitable for testing the name-place matching hypothesis10.
Meta-Analysis: Is There a Sampling Problem?
Throughout this contribution, I have argued that in light of the potential sampling
problem of the studies conducted by Pelham et al., even the few significant results I obtained
can be used to show that the hypothesis is not supported. In this section I provide evidence in
favor of my argument. 
It is clear that the sampling problem of the original contribution does not concern the
number of people involved in the studies (which is large), nor the procedure employed to
sample them (which is random). The sampling problem in the original studies concerns the
number of names (self-related objects) and cities (decision-targets) considered in each study.
Specifically, the number of cities and names used to compare the probabilities of the target
names is so small that we cannot confidently draw reliable conclusions from these studies. If
we could, we would conclude that the hypothesis is not supported. That is, I now show that if
the original studies are unbiased, they indicate that the hypothesis is not supported in the
whole population. Conversely, if one still sustains that the hypothesis is supported in the
population, than the studies must be necessarily biased and therefore inconclusive. 
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How can I prove my point? By employing Bernoulli's well-known law of large
numbers (cf. Isaac, 1995), we can determine, a priori, the relationship between a) the number
of sampled units (i.e., the number of names in a study) and b) the probability of obtaining a
supporting result. Fortunately for my case here, the relationship between number of sampled
units and probability of a supporting result is different, depending on whether the hypothesis
we are testing is verified in the population (i.e., supported if all possible members of the
population are considered) or falsified in the population (i.e., not supported if all possible
members of the population are considered). 
Let me clarify the nature of this relationship using an example. Assume I want to test
the hypothesis that Jack is taller than the average American person. Assume further that Jack
is indeed taller than average, thus my hypothesis is verified in the population. In the first
experiment, I compare Jack with one person I randomly choose from a given population, in
my second experiment I compare Jack with 10 people, in my third with hundred people and
so on. In the first experiment, I might find someone who is taller than Jack or smaller than
him, and thus find some non supporting result, more or less depending on my luck. Also in
my second experiment I might find some group that is on average taller than Jack, but the
chance of finding such a group is smaller than the chance to find a single person taller than
Jack. Bernoulli's law of large numbers assures us that the larger is the sample of cases I
compare Jack with, the more the average of the sample will be similar to the average of the
population, and thus the higher the probability of finding supporting results. Thus, if the
hypothesis is verified in the population, the larger the number of sampled units, the higher
the probability to verify the hypothesis.
Assume now that Jack is shorter than the average American person, so my hypothesis
is falsified in the population. In my first experiment, I might very well find a person taller
than Jack, but I might also select a person smaller than him. In larger samples, however, the
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probability of finding a comparison group with an average height lower than Jack's
decreases, because Jack is indeed smaller than the population average. Thus, if the
hypothesis is falsified in the population, the larger is the sample of units we employed, the
lower is the probability of verifying the hypothesis11. 
To summarize, from the foundations of statistical sampling we know that if a
hypothesis is supported in the population, the correlation between the probability of
supporting results and number of sampled units is positive, whereas if a hypothesis is not
supported in the population, the correlation is negative. Pelham et al.'s studies allow us to
compute such a correlation, because the authors provide 15 databases of different numbers of
names. In (original contribution) tables 1a, 1b, 10a, 10b, 12 and 13, two names are
compared, so the sampled units are two; in tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, the sampled units are four, in
tables 2, 3, and 8a the units are eight, in table 8b there are 27 units, and in table 9 there are
seven units. Table 5 in this contribution summarizes these numbers: For each original table
the number of names involved in the test and the probability of significant supporting result
is reported, upon which the correlation is computed. 
The correlation between the number of names in the study and proportion of
supporting results is -.54, which is negative, high and significantly different from zero, even
with only 15 observations. We therefore observe a strong negative association between the
number of sampled units tested in the studies and the proportion of significant results one
obtains in support of the hypothesis. As we know, this is the signature of hypotheses that are
not supported in the population. In fact, if we accept the data as unbiased, we should expect
that by enlarging the sample of names, the probability of supporting results would decrease,
vanishing as we approach a perfect sampling. If the hypothesis is supported in the population
despite this negative correlation, we could explain this result only as the effect of a
fundamental fault in the data, which makes studies with more names less and less reliable.
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Thus, by simply looking at the number of significant results and the number of names
involved in each study, we can conclude that the hypothesis and the data cannot be both valid
at the same time. Sustaining otherwise would be as paradoxical as saying that the height of
one person randomly chosen in a population is a better estimate of the population mean that
the mean computed across hundred persons12. 
An important characteristic of the previous meta-analysis it that it helps us
understand the status of the hypothesis even beyond and independently of the tests I have
conducted on the original data. In the previous meta-analysis, in fact, I computed the
probability of significant results according to the results I obtained. It is however possible to
conduct the same meta-analysis using the statistics reported by Pelham et al.'s original
article. According to the authors, each data set can be considered in favor of the hypothesis
because their analyses yielded significant results. Thus, the probability of supporting results
can be obtained by simply counting, in each data set, how many names show an actual
frequency higher than the expected frequency. Figure 3 presents the probability of supporting
results according to the authors' analyses as a function of the number of names considered in
each data set. The correlation between number of names and supporting results is now -.74,
which is even more negative than in the previous analyses. Figure 3 clearly suggests that the
probability of finding a supporting result tends toward zero as we increase the number of
names in the sample. Thus, also using Pelham et al.'s statistical approach, the original results
presented by the authors are still not in favor of the hypothesis13.
Conclusions
Pelham et al. have carried out a very intriguing line of research guided by a new and
original hypothesis: Major life decisions are influenced by unrelated items that assume a new
meaning when associated with the self. Their effort should be applauded for it is rare to find
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such enthusiasm in applying social psychological concepts to real life decisions, decisions
that are undoubtedly more important than letters on a computer screen. Pelham et al.'s
hypothesis, furthermore, might have challenged our idea that such important decisions as
moving to a city or choosing a career are influenced not only by future prospects, salaries,
opportunities for the family, migration flows, economical trends, potential improvements of
life conditions, and realization of personal dreams, but also by supposedly unrelated things,
like letters in a name. Strangely enough, this is one of the fundamental aims of science, to
challenge common sense and pre-existing views of reality.
Another aim of science is to promote hypotheses with compelling empirical evidence.
The empirical findings, I have argued, do not support the name-place matching hypothesis. I
have built my argument as follows: First, I have accepted the hypothesis as derived by the
original authors, without changing it or criticizing their theoretical apparatus. Second, I have
assumed that the data reported by the original authors were sufficient to verify the
hypothesis. Thus, starting from the same theory and the same data, I have approached the
hypothesis with a series of statistics which are, in my opinion, more appropriate than the
original ones. I have also tried to attribute the statistical effects I found to their likely causes,
avoiding the confusion between undistinguished significant effects and significant effects
supporting the hypothesis. Finally, I have generalized the results in order to identify the
effects of sampling biases and limitations of the empirical data, using consolidated statistical
theory and logical arguments.
My analyses suggest that the original data provide little evidence in support of the
hypothesis. As compared with the original authors' analyses, I found that very few name-city
pairs are more likely than chance, some pairs are even less likely than chance, and the
majority are as likely as chance. I also found that there is a strong association between the
number of names in the sample and the probability of finding a significant result, suggesting
      20
that if the data are reliable, we can conclude that the hypothesis is not supported in the
population.
In conclusion, my analyses strongly suggest that implicit egotism does not influence major
life decisions such as moving to a city or pursuing a career. Of course, new data, better
statistics, and more accurate sampling may challenge my conclusions as well. After all, the
first and most important aim of my contribution is to stimulate supporters of this hypothesis
to provide more robust evidence and more careful analyses in support of it. The second aim
of mine, fortunately, is to assure my dear friend Jack Priston that he is not doomed to end up
in jail and be a prisoner for the rest of his life. 
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Footnotes
1 In this contribution significance is evaluated at  = .05, even when multiple tests would
require a lower   (Bonferroni's correction). I made this choice in favor of the authors'
hypothesis and because a lower  would decrease the power of the tests, an issue that may
result important when the null hypothesis is not rejected. When Bonferroni's correction is
considered, out of 74 cases I obtained 61 (82%) non significant results, 3 (4%) significant
results contrary to the hypothesis, and 10 (13%) in support of the hypothesis.
2  I will consider 9 out of 10 studies because the data of Study 8 are not reported in the
original article.
3 To avoid confusion, I refer to tables in Pelham et al.'s as tables in the original article. In
addition, I do not capitalize the word "table" when it refers to a table in the original article,
and I capitalize the word when it refers to a table in the present article.
4 Although the authors did not specify which test they used, I was able to infer it (a
squared z-test on proportions that distributes  2), thanks to the careful calculations of an
unanimous reviewer of this paper. I am grateful for this help. Note that this method of testing
the difference between the expected and the observed distribution is highly questionable
(Cramer, 1999), because it is based on 1 degree of freedom rather than k-1 degrees of
freedom (where k is the number of names in the sample). I do not discuss this problem in the
text, because the overall test is not appropriate to test the hypothesis even if it is conducted
with a less questionable approach, such as a Chi-square test with k-1 degrees of freedom.
5 I wish to thank Charles Judd for suggesting this intriguing result. Note that this result is
not affected by the statistical power of the tests I have conducted, so it can help to rule out
possible concerns related with this issue.
6 A possible limitation of the analysis conducted on single names in Table 1 (original table
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8), is that the expected frequencies for some of the names are very small (<5). To overcome
this limitation, one can analyze only the names that yield expected frequencies greater than 5
(reported in boldface type in the original table 8). Considering only those names, one finds
that the percentage of supporting results goes from the original 22% to 33%, but also the
percentage of results against the hypothesis increases from the original 11% to 26%. Thus,
the fact that some names yield small expected frequencies does not influence the conclusions
of the analysis.
7 Note that, in favor of the authors' case, I am not considering the "priming effect", that is
parents that name their children after the state or the city the children are born in (people in
Rome are often called Romolo because Romolo was the founder of Rome). Considering this
effect, however, yields very interesting results: In Study 3 data about residents of four states
and data about immigrants in those states are presented. From those data can be evinced that,
for every name and across names, non-immigrants (total minus immigrants) are more likely
than immigrants to live in a matching state. For instance, for female names (tables 4 and 6),
the difference between observed and expected probabilities of name-place matches is .06 for
immigrants, and it is .12 for non-immigrants. Because the effect of implicit egotism is ruled
out by design in the non-immigrant sample, we can consider non-immigrants as a control
group. Thus, I found that the hypothesized effect is stronger in the control group than in the
experimental group (immigrants), another result in the opposite direction of the hypothesis.
8 More precisely, the ratio of two chi-squares, 
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m degrees of freedom, each divided by its degrees of freedom, distributes as F with n and m






2)(m/n). In our particular case, the degrees of
freedom are obtained subtracting 1 from the number of places we consider. For 8 cities, for
instance, the chi-square with the matching city has 7 degrees of freedom, whereas the chi-
square without the matching city has 6 degrees of freedom. The F ratio is than obtained as






9 It should be noted that the analyses I have conducted on the NxN tables are by no means
conservative tests. A more stringent test of the hypothesis should also test the distribution of
names within one city. In fact, the hypothesis not only implies that people should prefer
places with their names more than places with different names (an effect column-wise), but
also implies that places should attract more people with a similar name than people with a
different name (an effect row-wise). When the hypothesis is tested also row-wise, out of the
39 places, four places show a significant result in favor of the hypothesis, and one against the
hypothesis. Thus, a more stringent test of the hypothesis reduces the proportion of significant
results to 10%. I gratefully thank Marco Perugini for suggesting this argument. 
10 Given the unusual nature of the previous analysis, some detail is in order. First, for the
sake of completeness, is worth mentioning that I obtained 28% of significant results in the
opposite direction of the hypothesis (27% for table 3). Note that if the original data were in
support of the hypothesis, this percentage should have been around 50%, because 50% of the
mismatching tables are exactly the opposite of a matching tables. Thus, independently of
what direction our hypothesis goes, we obtain an error rate of about 22%. Second, the careful
reader may notice that in the 415,324 2x2 tables discussed in the text, every table appears
more than once. This is not a problem because those repetitions are independent of the
significance of the test performed on the table. For completeness, however, I have also
performed the tests on the 1204 unique 2x2 tables produced by any possible orders of
columns (with name-place mismatching), and I found 270 tables (22%) significantly in the
direction of the hypothesis, corresponding to the same proportion of significant results I
found for the 415,324 tables (15% for table 3). Third, it is important to note that the previous
analysis is not meant to draw conclusions regarding tables 2 or 3, already discussed in the
section about cross-tabulation studies. If we were to use the analysis for this purpose, in fact,
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we would draw contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, we can test the null hypothesis
that the original order in table 2 (table 3) is equivalent to any other mismatching order.
Because only 2% (6%) of the  mismatched orders produce an equal or greater number of
significant results than the original order, we can reject this null hypothesis of equivalence
with p=0.02 (p=0.06). This result can be surely interpreted in favor of the authors' case. On
the other hand, we can test the null hypothesis that the effects are due to the name-place
correspondence, by assessing the probability of obtaining no significant results when the
correspondence is removed. Because this probability is 0.009 (0.003), we can reject the null
hypothesis that the effects are due to the name-place correspondence with p=0.009
(p=0.003). Taken together, these results can be interpret either against or in favor of the
authors' hypothesis, depending on one's viewpoint. Either way, these results do not contradict
the analysis conducted on tables 2 and 3 in the  cross-tabulation section, and certainly do not
invalidate the evidence regarding the spurious effect produced by 2x2 tables. For readers
interested in performing this kind of analyses, ad hoc SAS macros are available on request
from the author. Without a fast computer, however, running these analyses requires a lot of
patience.
11 The third case is that in all the experiments the probability is equal to the probability in
the population, which entails a zero correlation but requires that all the experiments show the
same proportion of significant results, which is not the case here.
12 It is important to note that the previous analysis is quite robust even if it is based only
on 15 data sets. It is in fact very difficult to change the negative correlation I found into a
positive one, without decreasing the proportion of significant results. As an example, given
the present data, the correlation would become positive if we add a new data set with 50
names showing 100% of significant results, or four data sets of 20 names each showing
100% of significant results. 
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13 Note that the meta-analysis conducted on the original authors' results is not based on
the acceptance of the statistical null hypothesis of single tests, so it is not influenced by the
statistical power of those tests. 
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Table 1





Agatha .000091 .000000 183 .02 .90
Anne .001305 .000000 1703 2.22 .14
Bernice .001381 .000000 133 .18 .67
Clair .000155 .000315 25376 4.21 .04
Helen .009068 .010676 1405 .40 .53
Marie .004591 .005975 5021 2.09 .15
Mary .022972 .033901 11504 59.82 <.01
Rose .004141 .003431 583 .07 .79
Anthony .002508 .003858 1296 .94 .33
Augustine .000084 .000000 13057 1.10 .29
Bernard .001523 .001600 1250 <.01 .94
Charles .014408 .015509 21343 1.80 .18
David(s) .004549 .002035 2948 4.57 .03
Elmo .000126 .000000 1083 .14 .71
Francis .002432 .004752 2315 4.17 .04
Gabriel .000148 .000000 276 .04 .84
George .014347 .012532 6942 1.59 .21
Henry .006720 .033755 474 56.33 <.01
Ignance .000007 .000000 1328 .01 .92
Jacob .001111 .005319 376 5.99 .01
James .020204 .015049 10499 13.75 <.01
Joe .002471 .005117 2345 6.64 .01
John .029861 .022749 5187 8.83 <.01
Joseph .013665 .008143 36349 81.29 <.01
Leonard .002038 .002132 469 <.01 .96
Louis .004168 .006206 358699 397.62 <.01






Mark(s) .000679 .000000 113 .08 .78
Martin .001477 .000000 77 .11 .74
Matthew(s) .000536 .001037 1928 .90 .34
Michael .003717 .013210 757 16.33 <.01
Paul .005469 .005445 119736 .01 .91
Peter .002414 .002956 2706 .33 .57
Stephen(s) .001221 .000549 1823 .67 .41
Thomas .007796 .013746 873 3.57 .06
Vincent .001080 .000000 56 .06 .81
Note. Names yielding a significant result (  = .05) are in boldface type. Names yielding a
significant result (  = .05) opposite to the hypothesis are underlined.
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Table 2








p. F Ratio p.
Cali 132.59 <.01 89.32 <.01 1.27 .39
Texa 121.8 <.01 8.46 .21 12.34 <.01
Flori 91.86 <.01 51.19 <.01 1.54 .31
Illi 108.54 <.01 108.92 <.01 .85 .59
Penny 395.33 <.01 381.44 <.01 .89 .57
Ohi 69.69 <.01 56.64 <.01 1.05 .48
Michi 95.34 <.01 52.93 <.01 1.54 .31
Georgi 41.87 <.01 41.3 <.01 .87 .58
Tor 149.39 <.01 24.48 <.01 5.23 .03
Vanc 16.91 .02 16.9 .01 .86 .58
Ott 43.07 <.01 43.13 <.01 .86 .58
Edm 12.92 .07 12.15 .06 .91 .55
Cal 84.09 <.01 51.43 <.01 1.40 .35
Win 51.83 <.01 42.5 <.01 1.05 .49
Ham 70.78 <.01 49.95 <.01 1.21 .41
Lon 37.94 <.01 19.48 <.01 1.67 .27
Note. The second and third column report the Chi-square test and significance concerning
the distribution of people with the corresponding name in the four states considered. The
fourth and the fifth report the test excluding the matching state. The sixth and seventh
column report the Chi-square ratio and level of significance. Names yielding a significant
result (  = .05) in support of the hypothesis are in boldface type.
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Table 3








p. F Ratio p.
Florence 2374.30 <.01 175.24 <.01 9.03 .05
Georgia 1434.40 <.01 137.03 <.01 6.68 .07
Louise 1031.79 <.01 602.69 <.01 1.14 .43
Virginia 2094.59 <.01 151.45 <.01 9.22 .05
George 806.63 <.01 614.71 <.01 .87 .50
Kenneth 319.05 <.01 161.37 <.01 1.32 .39
Louis 4779.23 <.01 96.74 <.01 32.94 .01
Virgil 1338.61 <.01 865.24 <.01 1.03 .46
Florence 596.33 <.01 2.36 .31 168.80 <.01
Georgia 323.13 <.01 181.15 <.01 1.19 .42
Louise 165.83 <.01 139.41 <.01 .79 .53
Virginia 170.74 <.01 4.59 .10 24.82 <.01
George 30.01 <.01 28.21 <.01 .71 .56
Kenneth 3.79 .29 3.66 .16 .69 .57
Louis 126.85 <.01 2.09 .35 40.42 .01
Virgil 158.73 <.01 77.35 <.01 1.37 .38
Note. The second and third column report the Chi-square test and significance concerning
the distribution of people with the corresponding name in the four states considered. The
fourth and the fifth report the test excluding the matching state. The sixth and seventh
column report the Chi-square ratio and level of significance. Names yielding a significant
result (  = .05) in support of the hypothesis are in boldface type.
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Table 4












Note. The second and third columns report the Chi-square test and significance concerning
the distribution of people with the corresponding birthday in the seven cities considered. No
other test is reported because the first necessary condition is already not satisfied, that is, for
each birthday, the distribution of people in the seven cities is equal to the distribution
expected from chance.
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Table 5
Proportion of significant results supporting the hypothesis as a function of number of names
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Differences between actual and expected probabilities of living in eight Canadian
cities given a name. a) Names beginning with Tor. b) Names beginning with Edm. 
indicates the observed probability minus expected probability, where probability is the
frequency of a cell divided by the sample size. The probability of the name-place match is
emphasized with a darker bar. 
Figure 2. Differences between actual and expected probabilities of living in eight American
states given a name. a) Names beginning with Texa. b) Names beginning with Illi. 
indicates the observed probability minus expected probability, where probability is the
frequency of a cell divided by the sample size. The probability of the name-place match is
emphasized with a darker bar. 
Figure 3. Probability of obtaining a result in support of the hypothesis as a function of the
number of names included in a study, under the assumption that the analyses conducted by
the original authors are appropriate.
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Figure 1
a) Names beginning with Tor
b) Names beginning with Edm
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Figure 2
a) Names beginning with Texa
a) Names beginning with Illi
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Figure 3
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